ALERRT report shows 3 missed opportunities to slow, stop Uvalde school shooter

UVALDE, Texas (CBSDFW.COM) — In a report done by the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center, officials identified three missed opportunities to slow or stop the Uvalde school shooter from killing 19 kids and two teachers May 24.

According to the report, the first missed opportunity lied at 11:27 a.m., when a teacher exited the exterior door in the school's west hall and propped it open with a rock to prevent it from closing behind her.

At 11:28 a.m., the suspect was involved in a car crash in a dry canal near the school. Two people from a nearby business approached the crash before the suspect engaged them both with a rifle. The two then were able to flee unharmed and called 911.

One minute later, the same teacher returned through the west entry door, kicking the rock from the jamb. She then pulled the door shut and continued to look outside as she "frantically" spoke on her cell phone, the report stated.

The teacher re-entered the hallway multiple times, yelling for students to get into their classrooms, and the suspect entered the elementary through the same exterior door at 11:33 a.m.

Officials said upon their investigation, ALERRT staff noted rocks (some of which were painted) placed at most external doors of the building—making it apparent that propping doors open was common practice at the school.

"While the teacher did kick the rock and close the door prior to the suspect making entry, and the propping open of the door did not affect what happened in this situation, circumventing access control procedures can create a situation that results in danger to students," the report stated. "After the teacher closed the door, she did not check to see if the door was locked. Perhaps this was because the door is usually locked. However, on this day the door was not locked, and because it was not locked, the attacker was able to immediately access the building."

The second missed opportunity, officials said, was just before the shooter entered the building.

At 11:31 a.m., one of the first responding officers drove through the parking lot on the west side of the building at a "high rate of speed," the report stated. The suspect was in the parking lot at this time but the officer did not see him. 

The report stated if the officer had "driven more slowly or had parked his car at the edge of the school property and approached on foot, he might have seen the suspect and been able to engage him before the suspect entered the building."

Before the shooter's entry into the building at 11:33 a.m. came the last missed opportunity. That's when officials said a Uvalde police officer on scene at the crash site saw the suspect carrying a rifle outside the west hall entry.

The officer, armed with a rifle, asked his supervisor for permission to shoot the suspect. However, the supervisor either did not hear or responded too late, the report stated. The officer then turned to get confirmation from his supervisor, but when he turned back around, the suspect had already made his way inside.

The report stated the officer was justified in using deadly force to stop the attacker citing Texas Penal Code § 9.32 which states an individual is "justified in using deadly force when the individual reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the commission of murder (amongst other crimes)."

"In this instance, the UPD officer would have heard gunshots and/or reports of gunshots and observed an individual approaching the school building armed with a rifle. A reasonable officer would conclude in this case, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that use of deadly force was warranted."

The report concluded that if any of these three issues had worked out differently, they could have slowed or stopped the tragedy.

"If any of these three key issues had worked out differently, they could have stopped the tragedy that followed. First, had the exterior door been secured, the suspect may have never gained access to the building. At the very least, the suspect would have been delayed and responding officers would have had more time to find and stop the shooter before he entered the building. The UCISD PD officer might have seen the suspect had the officer not been driving as fast or if he had approached on foot. Lastly, had the UPD officer engaged the suspect with his rifle, he may have been able to neutralize, or at least distract, the suspect preventing him from entering the building."

Also included in the report were issues with the initial response within the building.

One issue involves having teams of officers at both ends of the south hallway. The report stated ALERRT teaches that a single team should be in a single area of building at a time. This is because splitting an existing team can create a crossfire situation that could result in officers shooting officers.

"The teams should have quickly communicated, and officers at one end of the hallway should have backed out and redeployed to another position."

Another issue revolves around officers losing momentum, the report stated.

The first three responding officers entered the west hall exterior door at 11:35 a.m. and an additional four officers entered the south hall at 11:36 a.m. Audio recordings indicate the suspect was actively firing his weapon until 11:36 a.m. 

"The first responding officers correctly moved toward the active gunfire, which was acting as their driving force. The seven officers converged on rooms 111 and 112 at 11:37:00. As the officers approached the doors, the suspect began firing. This gunfire caused both teams of officers to retreat from the doors. We note that the officers did not make contact with the doors (i.e., they never touched any part of the doors). The team approaching from the north fell back to the T-intersection of the west and south hallways. This position is approximately 67 feet from the doors of rooms 111 and 112. The team approaching from the south fell back to the south end of the south hallway. The team in the south hallway were not visible on camera, so their distance from the affected classrooms is unknown."

The report stated ALERRT teaches that first responders' main priority in an active shooter situation is to first stop the killing and then stop the dying and that their first priority is to preserve the lives of victims and potential victims.

"There is a chance that officers will be shot, injured, or even killed while responding. This is something that every officer should be acutely aware of when they become a law enforcement officer."

Read the full report here: