U.S. Troops Ready For New Afghan Mission
Until this fall, the men and women of the 3rd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division thought they'd be going to Iraq.
Then – as American foreign policy shifted – so suddenly did their mission.
These wintry Afghan peaks don't have much in common with Iraq's baking deserts, but much of the 3rd Brigade's training was nevertheless a perfect fit.
"Both conflicts have a large counter-insurgency element," says Lt. Col Long, "so we were quickly able to get these guys up to speed."
The 20,000 to 30,000 American troops who will land in Afghanistan over the next 18 months know exactly what they're getting into: a complicated and often cruel guerilla war.
In that sense, they're far better prepared for the challenge than the troops who arrived in Iraq in 2002. For the first three years, as the lethal insurgency there ballooned, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seemed to be in denial, trying to dodge using the "I" word.
By its own admission, the U.S. military didn't put effective counter-insurgency measures into effect in Iraq until 2007.
But once the Pentagon embraced the strategy, it didn't waste any time translating it to Afghanistan. The lessons learned in Iraq underpin the attitude and understanding of every U.S. soldier serving in Afghanistan now.
Just listen to Sgt. 1st Class John Tierney, who will soon be heading out with his unit to occupy an area south of Kabul partly controlled by the Taliban.
4735349"It's going to be a classic counter-insurgency fight," he says.
"A lot of people just throw the term 'Taliban' around to talk about whoever's doing bad stuff.
"We know there's an ideological religious-based Taliban. But there's also a criminal element that uses the name Taliban, who are just in it for the money."
His boss, Lt. Col. Long adds, "To defeat them, it's going to be important to understand the motivation of the fighters who call themselves Taliban."
In other words, big guns and military muscle aren't necessarily the most effective weapons.
Good intelligence, local support, offering money or jobs, and negotiation – these should all be in the arsenal too.
It's the approach that Gen. David Petraeus finally adopted after five years of bloody fighting in Iraq looked as if it would end in humiliating defeat.
Of course, having Iraqi experience and a vocabulary that includes the word "insurgency" doesn't mean the U.S. or its NATO partners will be able to stabilize Afghanistan, but they will help.
The 2009 American campaign in Afghanistan is also tempered by a new realism.
Gone is the grandiose rhetoric about democracy and freedom.
Lt. Col. Long, looking south over the rugged mountains toward the area he'll soon be patrolling, will judge his unit's success like this:
"As long as when we leave, it's better than when we arrived. Maybe not through the whole province, but in specific areas that we were able to influence and make safer.
"And that we bring all our guys back and they have nothing to be embarrassed about – but are proud of the job they've done."
