Transcript: Zalmay Khalilzad on "Face the Nation," October 24, 2021
The following is a transcript of an interview with Zalmay Khalilzad, Former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation that aired Sunday, October 24,2021, on "Face the Nation."
MARGARET BRENNNAN: The chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's victory there has left many questions about whether Americans are actually safer now. Until a few days ago, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad was the Biden administration's top envoy, negotiating directly with the Taliban. He brokered the Trump era deal with the Taliban, in which the US promised to withdraw all U.S. forces, and he joins us now for his first television interview. Welcome to the program.
FMR. US ENVOY FOR AFGHANISTAN ZAL KHALILZAD: It's great to be with you, MARGARET.
MARGARET BRRENNAN: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, said this was a strategic failure, the end of America's longest war. He said, "The enemy is now in charge in Kabul." Do you share that view?
KHALILZAD: Well, I think there is a lot of anger and a lot of resentment about what has happened there. I think with regard to terrorism, we largely have achieved that objective. On the issue of building a democratic Afghanistan - I think that- that did not succeed. The struggle goes on. The Talibs are a reality of Afghanistan. We did not defeat them. In fact, they were making progress on the battlefield even as we were negotiating with them. And the reason we negotiated with them was because militarily things were not going as well as we would have liked. We were losing ground each year.
MARGARET BRENNAN: They were winning the war.
KHALILZAD: Slowly but making progress. And for us to reverse the progress that they were making was going to require a lot more effort.
MARGARET BRENNAN: How many Americans remain in Afghanistan today?
KHALILZAD: We aren't sure, the frank answer is, because not every American-- some of them are Afghan Americans who have families there, who live there and that--
MARGARET BRENNAN: It's hundreds, isn't it?
KHALILZAD: I think it's very likely that it'll be in hundreds, but we don't know. The truth of the matter is, we don't know.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The UN has given some pretty dire projections of what's happening inside Afghanistan right now. More than a million children could die of malnutrition in the next year. The Taliban has still not allowed girls aged 12 and older to return to school. They may say something, but they're not doing it. There are videos of women being beaten in the streets, just demonstrating for their rights. I mean, isn't this proof that the Taliban has no intention of becoming a democratic government or any kind of government that protects human rights?
KHALILZAD: Well, there's no question that the Taliban have a different vision for Afghanistan. It's their vision of a more Islamic government than existed before. And there is obviously disputes about the interpretation of Islam.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Little girls going to school?
KHALILZAD: Well, I think there is a disagreement inside the Taliban. That's why I think that we can't say all Taliban behave in the same way. There are factions inside it. Right now, for example, in at least three or four provinces, high schools for girls have been opened. And they say the same will happen as far as the rest of the country is concerned. And we should hold them to that, keep pressure on them. If they don't-- Taliban don't move toward more inclusiveness, respecting the rights of the Afghan people, and then honoring their commitment to us on terrorism; there will be no move towards normalcy and there shouldn't be. There should be no release of funds. So their economy could collapse and in that collapse a new civil war could start.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do they know where the leader of Al-Qaeda is? The UN says he's living in Afghanistan.
KHALILZAD: Well, the report that I have seen indicates he could be in Afghanistan or adjacent territories.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Ayman al-Zawahiri.--
KHALILZAD: --al-Zawahiri. I don't know whether the Taliban know it. The Taliban that I dealt with, they told me they did not know where he was.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You did not include the Afghan government in the deal between the U.S. and Taliban. That was a later step that you promised to to include them, but for the deal you brokered...
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: H.R. McMaster, retired general, former national security adviser to President Trump, said you- you brokered a surrender deal. How do you respond to that?
KHALILZAD: The reason for the deal, to my friend General McMaster and others, is because we weren't winning the war. How long does General McMaster think we should continue while losing ground each year? Why- why- why was that the case after 20 years? That with so much investment, so much loss of life that we were losing ground to the Talibs, and the alternative was either a negotiated settlement or more of the same. And people way above my pay grade decided more of the same is not acceptable anymore.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because the American public had lost the will to fight.
KHALILZAD: And- and the fight wasn't going right. The fight was not going right after 20 years.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But on the specific point of one of the things in the deal. Why did the Trump administration agree to the Taliban's demand that 5000 prisoners be released? 5000 prisoners who could very easily end up right on that battlefield?
KHALILZAD: Right?
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why did you do that before peace talks?
KHALILZAD: Well, that- the Taliban, in order to sit with the government, to negotiate, wanted some confidence-building measures from both sides. Their demand was all prisoners be released by both sides as a goodwill gesture as they were going to sit together at the table to negotiate peace.
MARGARET BRENNAN: What do they need potential fighters for if they're negotiating peace?
KHALILZAD: Well, but they were giving up fighters also, because there was an exchange of prisoners, not a release, one sided release.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The Ghani government was not supportive of your work.
KHALILZAD: I was representing the United States to carry out the president's direction. But I believe the biggest difficulty was that President Ghani and a few other Afghan leaders did not believe that we were serious about withdrawal for a long time, and they like the status quo compared to a political settlement in which they might not have the jobs that they had and- and the resources that the US was providing would not be there. They preferred the status quo to a political settlement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But if the United States is promising essentially to deliver the Afghan government and to make this deal happen, wasn't it diplomatic malpractice--
KHALILZAD: No.
MARGARET BRENNAN --for the secretary of state not to be holding Ghani's hand walking him through this? Shouldn't Mike Pompeo have been doing that? Shouldn't Tony Blinken have been doing that?
KHALILZAD: Both of them spent a lot of time with uh-- President Ghani to take the negotiation seriously to believe that we were--
MARGARET BRENNAN: How was more arm twisting not happening then, if all the blame is to go on the Ghani government--
KHALILZAD: I believe myself, now that you've asked, that rather than that, we pressed Ghani too much, it's my judgment that we didn't press him hard enough. That we--
MARGARET BRENNAN: So the Trump administration could have pushed harder.
KHALILZAD: We could have pushed harder. I believe in retrospect, my judgment is that we could have pressed President Ghani harder.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Secretary Blinken has said he inherited the- President Biden inherited this deal and not a plan to execute it?
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Whose job was that?
KHALILZAD: Well, I think that they did inherit a-a-a the agreement. No doubt they had that opportunity to take a look at it. And they did. They could have made a variety of decisions with regard to that agreement. They decided to stick with the withdrawal provisions.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why wasn't there a better plan in place from the Trump administration or crafted by the Biden administration to execute what you put on paper?
KHALILZAD: Well, this execution of the last phase was not a military withdrawal that went awry. It was the response of the Afghan people to- what was happening that created the scenes at the airport. It was a combination of fear and opportunity. Fear, because for a long time, everybody was saying, including some officials, that when the Talibs come into Kabul, there would be a terrible war. Street to street fighting, destruction of the city. So people were afraid, that was one. Two, the impression was created that anyone who can make it to the airport, whether you have documents or not, you would be evacuated to the United States and to-to Europe. That combination led to this flood of people to come to the airport and cause the- the- the terrible scenes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Is there blame to be borne by President Biden and his diplomats who you were working with?
KHALILZAD: Well, I believe that- that the diplomats worked very hard. The president made the decision that he did not to pursue a condition-based approach, but just the calendar-based approach, because of a belief that if you pursue a condition based approach - that the Afghan must negotiate and come to an agreement first - that we will be stuck there for a long time.
MARGARET BRENNAN: In your resignation letter, you said, "This did not turn out as you envisaged."
KHALILZAD: Right. I would have wished- I would have liked to see a negotiated settlement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why wasn't there a plan in place, at least on the counterterrorism front, to deal with the Taliban, to talk to the Taliban?
KHALILZAD: Well we did talk to the Taliban. We have a set of agreements with them, some of which have not been released yet, on what they will do on the terrorism front. We hold them accountable to those agreements. And--
MARGARET BRENNAN: So - I'm sorry - because the administration says that those agreements are not in place, which is why they're trying to build those relationships now with the Taliban--
KHALILZAD: No no, there is an agreement in place. There is agreement in place with the Taliban on terrorism and counterterrorism. But--
MARGARET: To do what?
KHALILZAD: Well, that they will not host. They will not allow fundraising. They will not allow training. They will not allow recruitment of- by individuals or groups that will threaten the security of the United States and our allies, including Al Qaeda. But since we don't trust them, and since we decided to leave, we're going to do that from beyond Afghanistan. And that's what remains a critical mission.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think Americans are safer now?
KHALILZAD: The terrorist threat from Afghanistan is not what it used to be. The American people should be pleased -- not with the way the final phase happened, we all are unhappy with that -- but that the Afghan war is over for the United States. The burden has been reduced, that we achieved the goal of the devastating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The CIA says al Qaeda could reconstitute in as little as a year within Afghanistan.
KHALILZAD: Well, our record of predicting things, unfortunately, we need to be a little humble in this regard, but--
MARGARET BRENNAN: So we're not safer? You're hoping we are.
KHALILZAD: We are much safer than we were before we went to Afghanistan, when al Qaeda was running camps--
MARGARET BRENNAN: You're talking about 2001.
KHALILZAD: --and thousands of people were being trained, al Qaida, the sponsor of Afghanistan. That is gone.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But from August of this year on.
KHALILZAD: Well we need to keep an eye on the situation. Not- not to do the same thing we did prior to 9/11, as we were seeing Al Qaeda was developing, training, organizing. And we didn't have a serious strategy in response to it until after 9/11. We shouldn't repeat that mistake again.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you feel you were misled by the Taliban?
KHALILZAD: Well, I don't allow people to mislead me. I do my homework. A whole of government. This was not Zal Khalilzad alone doing this. I had the military, the intelligence, everyone with me.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You're the only one out here defending it though.
KHALILZAD: Yeah, but-- that's one reason why I left.
MARGARET BRENNAN: I give you credit for coming and talking about it.
KHALILZAD: I'm- I- One reason I left the government, as I wrote in my letter, is that- that the debate wasn't really, as it should be, based on realities and facts of what happened, what was going on and what our alternatives were. The decision ultimately was made to put conditions-based aside and- and follow a calendar basis.
MARGARET BRENNAN: President Biden could have asked to keep troops longer, is what you're saying?
KHALILZAD: He could have, then there would have been consequences for it, which is that the Talibs might not have accepted that and therefore they- no attack on U.S. forces that was in place for so many months.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Thirteen American service people died though.
KHALILZAD: As a result of a terrorist attack at the airport by DAESH, which the Talibs are enemy of--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Carried out by ISIS is who you're talking about.
KHALILZAD: By ISIS, and they are at war with each other.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But that bomber was released from prison by the Taliban.
KHALILZAD: Well, not with the intention--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Not with the intention. But that was what happened. So this wasn't an orderly withdrawal. Thirteen Americans died.
KHALILZAD: Nobody- nobody, I would- I'm not saying it was an orderly withdrawal. This was an ugly final phase. No doubt about it. Could have been a lot worse. It could be a lot-- The Talibs did help with the withdrawal. General McKenzie would tell you they did everything we asked them to do during that final phase. I was on the phone with them constantly, "Push this, close this road, allow these buses." It could have been a lot worse. Kabul could have been destroyed, street to street fighting could have occurred. I went to Afghanistan after 30-plus years after the Soviet withdrawal and what happened? Everywhere you looked, it was destruction like some German city after World War Two. This could have been a lot worse. It could have been a lot worse. It can still be a lot worse, or it can get better. But the choice is now mostly theirs, Afghans. Rumi, the great Afghan born in Balkh, said, "You can walk with people, You can not walk for them."
MARGARET BRENNAN: Ambassador, thank you for your time.
KHALILZAD: Thank you.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Thank you for taking questions.
KHALILZAD: Thank you very much. Good to see you.
The following is an unabridged transcript of Margaret Brennan's interview with Zalmay Khalilzad, Former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation that aired Sunday, October 24,2021, on "Face the Nation."
MARGARET BRENNNAN: The chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's victory there has left many questions about whether Americans are actually safer now. Until a few days ago, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad was the Biden administration's top envoy, negotiating directly with the Taliban. He brokered the Trump era deal with the Taliban, in which the US promised to withdraw all U.S. forces, and he joins us now for his first television interview. Welcome to the program.
FMR. US ENVOY FOR AFGHANISTAN ZALMAY KHALILZAD: It's great to be with you, MARGARET.
MARGARET BRENNNAN: We have a lot to talk to (you about), and I want to get through it all. But I want to start with some sad news of the week, the passing of Colin Powell. You worked with him closely during the Bush administration. What do you think the secretary's legacy is?
KHALILZAD: Well, he's just a great American. He led with distinction not only in the military field, but also diplomatically. He built a big coalition in Afghanistan; not only in going to Afghanistan, but afterwards for reconstruction of Afghanistan. I remember going with him to Tokyo for the pledging conference. I had great personal relations with him. I- he actually influenced my book that I did called Envoy by saying, "Write less about what you did in government and more about how did you come to America, your growing up." And that was wise advice that shows this selflessness, the other side of his personality to help others. And so I remember him very fondly. I'm indebted to him.
MARGARET BRENNAN: He told Bob Woodward shortly before he passed that he was fine with the US withdrawing from Afghanistan, that in the end, he said it was going to be Afghans that won that war.
KHALILZAD: That- that is the view of so many who initially favored going to Afghanistan. Although then there were differences of view as to whether we should keep a small force - not to do nation building and do counterterrorism - versus those who thought we should transform the whole region because that region was now the source of the security problems of the world like Europe was in the 19th and 20th century, and that Afghanistan and Iraq will be the building blocks of a new, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Middle East.
MARGARET BRENNAN: That was the Bush administration's thinking.
KHALILZAD: Right, and- and Colin Powell was skeptical. But he served loyally and effectively during the period that he was in government. Yes. So the view that we should leave gained widespread support even among those who initially supported going into Afghanistan.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And that brings us to where we are right now.
KHALILZAD: Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You have spent more time with the Taliban than any American.
KHALILZAD: Mhm.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You were intimately involved with this negotiation.
KHALILZAD: Mhm.
MARGARET BRRENNAN: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, said this was a strategic failure, the end of America's longest war. He said, "The enemy is now in charge in Kabul." Do you share that view?
KHALILZAD: Well, I think there is a lot of anger and a lot of resentment about what has happened there. I think we went to Afghanistan to make sure that those who had participated in the 9/11 attack were brought to justice and that Al-Qaeda would never be able to use Afghanistan or any other terrorist group to attack the United States again. I think with regard to terrorism, we largely have achieved that objective. On the issue of building a democratic Afghanistan - I think that- that did not succeed. The struggle goes on. And it would have to be carried on by the Afghans themselves. We transformed Afghanistan. I think millions of Afghans now are educated, cell phones, the Taliban are going to have a hard time putting them back in the box the way they had put people in the 1990s. But we- we did not achieve the second objective of the transformation, an enduring transformation of Afghanistan into a democratic allied nation state.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The enemy is in charge of Kabul. Is that how you view the Taliban government now?
KHALILZAD: Well, we fought the Taliban, obviously for 20 years. They are not our allies, or partners. So there is mistrust and distrust. But we would have obviously preferred a different outcome, a negotiated outcome in which the people who supported the Republic, meaning the government since we went into Afghanistan, sharing power with- with the Talibs. The Talibs are a reality of Afghanistan. We did not defeat them. In fact, they were making progress on the battlefield even as we were negotiating with them. And the reason we negotiated with them was because militarily things were not going as well as we would have liked. We were losing ground each year.
MARGARET BRENNAN: They were winning the war.
KHALILZAD: Slowly but making progress. And for us to reverse the progress that they were making was going to require a lot more effort. And we tried it a couple of times to increase the effort, but not making progress against them. So we thought it's better to get the negotiated settlement. The negotiation was a result of- based on the judgment that we weren't winning the war and therefore time was not on our side and better to make a deal sooner than later. And that's what we did.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And that was the conclusion of President Obama. President Trump, President Biden, and I'm going to get into the details of the deal, but I want to ask you a little bit about what's happening now since you've been the main conduit to the Taliban since the government's fall, you've been trying to get Americans out. How many Americans remain in Afghanistan today?
KHALILZAD: We aren't sure, the frank answer is, because not every American-- some of them are Afghan Americans who have families there, who live there and that--
MARGARET BRENNAN: It's hundreds, isn't it?
KHALILZAD: I think it's very likely that it'll be in hundreds, but we don't know. The truth of the matter is, we don't know. We have tried to, when I was in government, reach out through various means, phone calls, emails, embassy statements publicly to- to get in touch and- and many had not, and then later some did. Some were ambivalent about going or staying. Some wanted to bring 65 members of their families who were not Americans with them. If they couldn't bring all of them, they were not willing to leave themselves. So lots of issues. But I can tell you that a lot of good people worked very hard to bring as many Americans- all Americans if they wanted to leave. In our system of- fortunately, we can't coerce American citizens to leave, so they have to make a decision. And- and but my judgment is there could be still hundreds of Americans there.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Hundreds, and the Pentagon had--
KHALILZAD: -could be there.
MARGARET BRENNAN: -- The Pentagon has acknowledged there are also U.S. trained commandos--
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: --Afghan commandos who were left behind, people who fought alongside Americans for years, along with interpreters who are still trying to get out. How many of them are left? And do we bear moral responsibility to get them out?
KHALILZAD: Well, we have to, first of all, recognize they didn't fight for us. They fought for their country. And sometimes we self flagellate a little that what happened in Afghanistan was largely our effort. Afghans are divided. Some of them believe in a Republic, more Western style government, these are mostly urban Afghans. But then there are other Afghans who support the more Islamic government, like the Taliban group. And--
MARGARET BRENNAN: But these were trained allied forces, many of whom want to get out now. Do we bear responsibility?--
KHALILZAD: Those who want to get out, we should obviously help them. We have brought- I can say, thousands of Afghans who helped us and their family members, and this process will continue. I've got the Talibs to agree to make a statement on national television in Afghanistan that any Afghan who has worked with the United States wants to leave, they will not make any problems or create obstacles on their way to the port.
MARGARET BRENNAN: There are reports they're being hunted down and many are in hiding.
KHALILZAD:Well, I see these reports and sometimes we when I was in government, I looked into those reports and found that they were not necessarily always accurate and that there have been people who have also acted as Talibs who have taken revenge for some personal or something that the person had done against what they regard to have been unfair to them. But we are keeping the pressure and we should continue to keep the pressure on the Talibs to honor the commitments that they have made.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Who does that? The CIA or the State Department, who?
KHALILZAD: Well, the pressure comes from the whole of government with the State Department in the lead. Although in our last engagement with the Talibs, the deputy director of the CIA led our discussions with them. But we- a diplomatic channel is very much- in the lead. We have an embassy in Doha and the charge meets regularly with the Taliban.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The UN has given some pretty dire projections of what's happening inside Afghanistan right now. More than a million children could die of malnutrition in the next year. The Taliban has still not allowed girls aged 12 and older to return to school. They may say something, but they're not doing it. There are videos of women being beaten in the streets, just demonstrating for their rights. I mean, isn't this proof that the Taliban has no intention of becoming a democratic government or any kind of government that protects human rights?
KHALILZAD: Well, there's no question that the Taliban have a different vision for Afghanistan. It's their vision of a more Islamic government than existed before. And there is obviously disputes about the interpretation of Islam.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Little girls going to school?
KHALILZAD: Well, I think there is a disagreement inside the Taliban. That's why I think that we can't say all Taliban behave in the same way. There are factions inside it. Right now, for example, in at least three or four provinces, high schools for girls have been opened. And they say the same will happen as far as the rest of the country is concerned. And we should hold them to that, keep pressure on them. They want assistance, they want normalcy in relations. They want their moneys of Afghanistan and the US banks to be unfrozen.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Should it be?
KHALILZAD: I think we shouldn't do so without a clear understanding of what they will do in exchange for which- what steps we are willing to take. And there has to be a time in that agreement that has to be kind of a roadmap as to when they will do what and- and in response to that what it is that we will do. I think that's- that task is ahead of us.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But don't you think it's a bit of a fantasy to say that the Taliban will do all of those things you just laid out? Aren't they proving themselves to not be capable of that?
KHALILZAD: Well, I- I think that- my judgment is that the Taliban are not the same Taliban of the 1990s, but that's mostly true of some, especially those who we negotiated with, they're more worldly. But there are other factions where some commanders were less exposed to the world, and they are more hardline, and it's then that struggle that the future of Afghanistan would be decided. If they don't-- Taliban don't move toward more inclusiveness, respecting the rights of the Afghan people, and then honoring their commitment to us on terrorism; there will be no move towards normalcy and there shouldn't be. There should be no release of funds. So their economy could collapse and in that collapse a new civil war could start. So the Talibs have some difficult, important choices to make, and I think they are debating that themselves. I believe the best approach is to engage with them, with a clear list of what it is that we want in exchange for what they would like to see, whether we can do all of them or some of them. There has to be a step by step agreement and a- and a roadmap that both sides agree to.
MARGARET BRENNAN: It's a bit of a euphemism to say some hard line individuals are in that government. I mean, the minister of the Interior has a $10 million bounty on his head because he's a US designated terrorist, a member of the Haqqani network.
KHALILZAD: Absolutely.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Direct ties to Al-Qaeda.
KHALILZAD:: Absolutely. And therefore for us to do anything, that issue has to be dealt with to our satisfaction. Haqqani's breaking to our satisfaction from Al-Qaeda has to be a pre-condition, a condition for progress on the agenda that they have, including the issue of unfreezing the- the- bank accounts.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So you acknowledge that the Taliban has not cut ties with Al Qaeda?
KHALILZAD: The Taliban have agreed not to allow Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group, which was a big success for them to mention Al-Qaida twice in the agreement.--
MARGARET BRENNAN: The agreement you negotiated back in 2020.
KHALILZAD: Right. To plot and plan from the territories they controlled, or now that they control Afghanistan, from Afghanistan against the United States and our allies. That was what we wanted from them. But--
MARGARET BRENNAN: That is what they said on paper, but Chairman Milley says they did not live up to that.
KHALILZAD: Well, they- they have lived up- we are convinced that they are not allowing- they are not allowing plotting and planning operations by Al-Qaeda against the United States. We always would like to see more from the Taliban, from almost any country that we deal with on this issue. We would like them to do more. We would like to expel- to- to get them to expel any Al-Qaeda member who was there. Although they do argue that some of these people have been there for decades, because during the Soviet period that is, they had come to Afghanistan. Some have married Afghans, they have children and grandchildren there. But nevertheless the- the Taliban should do more. We should press them to do more on the issue of terrorism.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do they know where the leader of Al-Qaeda is? The UN says he's living in Afghanistan.
KHALILZAD: Well, the report that I have seen indicates he could be in Afghanistan or adjacent territories.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Ayman al-Zawahiri.--
KHALILZAD: --al-Zawahiri. I don't know whether the Taliban know it. The Taliban that I dealt with, they told me they did not know where he was.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you believe that?
KHALILZAD: Well, I didn't- there is a, as I said before, a lack of trust between us and them. That's why it's very important not to take their word for it, in terms of what they say or what they commit to. That's why we are saying there has to be over the horizon monitoring of the commitments on terrorism and the ability to strike if we see plotting and planning going on.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Let's talk about the deal you negotiated.
KHALILZAD: Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why did you resign?
KHALILZAD: Well, I- I was asked by the former president to negotiate our withdrawal from Afghanistan and get commitments from the Talibs on the terrorism front. That has been achieved. We are out. Our longest war is over. Now we're in a new phase, dealing with evacuation issues and humanitarian issues, which I think the United States, the American people are very generous, providing humanitarian assistance. I thought that the- the- it was the- given the new phase, it was time to move on. And we have also adjusted, kind of, how we will do Afghanistan moving forward. So it was- it was time for me to- to move on as well.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You said this was a job to negotiate the US withdrawal.
KHALILZAD: Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: In the past, you've said something about this also being a peace deal.
KHALILZAD: Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Was it really just about not shooting Americans on their way out the door? Is that what this assignment was?
KHALILZAD: In fact we even negotiated a condition based comprehensive agreement that- that had four elements: terrorism commitment from the Talibs, which was a fundamental, timetable for US withdrawal, intra-Afghan negotiations, and an agreement on a new government and a comprehensive permanent ceasefire. And this was a package, and the US withdrawal was the most important for us because Afghanistan was being very expensive, I know cost almost $40 billion a year, and the world has changed since 2001. Resources were needed for other key issues like, how do you deal with China, the technological race, the geopolitical competition with them, and sometimes even domestic issues. So for us, terrorism and withdrawal was the most important, but we wanted to also do the right thing for the Afghans, and- and we put those two others conditions also as part of the agreement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Well, the agreement itself is what I want to talk to you about, because when you talk to, as I have, former Afghan officials, or when you listen to General Milley or General McKenzie testify on Capitol Hill, they go all the way back to that 2020 deal you negotiated. And they say that was the moment.
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: That was the moment when America signed this deal, that it was incredibly demoralizing to Afghan forces. So when President Biden says they just melted away, they say it was that deal you brokered that did that.
KHALILZAD: Well, I say to that a couple of things. One is that the reason we moved towards that deal -- President Obama wanted to do it, President Trump did it, and President Biden continued with it -- is because militarily we were not making progress. We were not winning the war, number one. So the question was, do we do what we were doing, losing ground for many more years without winning? Or do we seek an alternative? And two, one of the big questions, we have to ask ourselves, why the Afghan army did not fight? Did they not believe in the cause themselves?
MARGARET BRENNAN: They fought for 20 years.
KHALILZAD: Well, while we were there. After our withdrawal-- were they just fighting for us? Or were they fighting for a cause? Did the Talibs have a belief in what they were doing and the government forces did not? Was it because of the corruption of the regime that we had helped, that they had lost confidence in that regime? That the government did not treat the soldiers right, paying their salaries, looking after the families of those who lost their lives? This has to be one of the key issues. Why is it? I think it's too simple and not altogether right, unless we think this army fought only because of the U.S., to say that the agreement was responsible for why they didn't fight and they disintegrated. I believe there were many more reasons, and- and- and I think the Pentagon, I'm sure, is looking at this--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Yes.
KHALILZAD: -- and we need to be looking at this issue closely because we spent a lot of effort--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Yes.
KHALILZAD:--and a lot of time. And why was it that at the end they disintegrated? I think that would be domestic factors of Afghanistan as well, as well as the way how we build this force. It needs to be looked at.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And- and we hear promises from the administration. They're going to do a hot wash of all of this--
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But on that point,--
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: --don't you see some legitimacy to the argument that when the most powerful country in the world legitimizes the Taliban, sits down with them, says we will sign this agreement alongside you, that the message sent to every governor, to every soldier -- writing's on the wall. The Taliban's coming back to power no matter what.
KHALILZAD: I can tell you that- that the Afghan people overwhelmingly wanted a peace agreement. They were tired of this war, especially they didn't see it going in the right direction. And the agreement said that there would be negotiations between the government and the Talibs. So they opened the door for a peaceful settlement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But- but you did not include the Afghan government in the deal between the U.S. and Taliban. That was a later step that you promised to to include them, but for the deal you brokered...
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: H.R. McMaster, retired general, former national security adviser to President Trump, said you- you brokered a surrender deal. How do you respond to that?
KHALILZAD: Well, first of all, on the same day that we signed the deal with the Talibs, we had a joint announcement with NATO's secretary general in Kabul endorsing that agreement and the continuation of our support. While we signed the agreement, we continue to support the Afghan armed forces. In fact, that deal allowed us something that has not gotten much attention. That while the Talibs agreed not to attack us after the deal was signed, they allowed that- they agreed that we could come to the defense of the Afghan forces if they were attacked and for--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because they were attacking the Afghan forces that we backed.
KHALILZAD: And so we came to the defense of the Afghan forces. They allowed us- we could kill Talibs during the withdrawal period, but they couldn't attack us. Second is- the reason for the deal, to my friend General McMaster and others, is because we weren't winning the war. How long does General McMaster think we should continue while losing ground each year? Why- why- why was that the case after 20 years? That with so much investment, so much loss of life that we were losing ground to the Talibs, and the alternative was either a negotiated settlement or more of the same. And people way above my pay grade decided more of the same is not acceptable anymore. We needed to--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Above your pay grade. You're talking about Secretary of State Pompeo or are you talking about President Trump?
KHALILZAD: Both, and in the current administration too. They were deliberated on and the decision was what it was. Sometimes people think that I might have- as if I had all the authority for decision making. Well, we know that is obviously not true. But again, I mean, having participated with several presidents, I can assure you that there is a lot of deliberation, and given the alternatives available, a choice was made
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because the American public had lost the will to fight.
KHALILZAD: And- and the fight wasn't going right. The fight was not going right after 20 years.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So I want to go through some of the specifics with you--
KHALILZAD: Yes, please.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because you were the practitioner here, right?
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So one of the chief criticisms of you is you gave up too much and you got too little.
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: I know you're saying you were just the guy carrying out what the president--
KHALILZAD: I can take criticism. No- no issues there, I'm sure there are always alternatives, yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But on the specific point of one of the things in the deal. Why did the Trump administration agree to the Taliban's demand that 5000 prisoners be released? 5000 prisoners who could very easily end up right on that battlefield?
KHALILZAD: Right?
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why did you do that before peace talks?
KHALILZAD: Well, that- the Taliban, in order to sit with the government, to negotiate, wanted some confidence-building measures from both sides. Their demand was all prisoners be released by both sides as a goodwill gesture as they were going to sit together at the table to negotiate peace.
MARGARET BRENNAN: What do they need potential fighters for if they're negotiating peace?
KHALILZAD: Well, but they were giving up fighters also, because there was an exchange of prisoners, not a release, one sided release. The government had over fifteen thousand or so prisoners, the government of Afghanistan. And the Talibs had a thousand prisoners. The Talibs said that they would release all of theirs, but they want all of the prisoners that the government had. The government-- ultimately going back and forth, we agreed as a confidence building measure to start intra-Afghan negotiations, 5,000 for 1,000. And there wasn't any shortage of fighters on either side. 300 thousand on one side. 70 thousand on the other side or more, maybe or less. So it wasn't- And they made a commitment that these people-- freed prisoners by both sides will not go back to the battlefield.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Was that lived up to?
KHALILZAD: I think in-in the majority of cases, an overwhelming majority of cases, our judgment is yes. Although there was some instances, and the Talibs attributed that- that those people who went back were the ones that the government, after releasing them, were hunting them. Now that I would say that the Taliban, some of the soldiers that were released or some of their fighters that were released did go back into the battle.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So-- but you can understand if you're sitting in Kabul, in the US allied elected government of Afghanistan and you're saying, "The fate of my country is being decided without me at the table and the enemy is having thousands of prisoners released, I'm being sold down the river here."
KHALILZAD: No, the question was that what we did, in fact, was the opposite, which is they were fighting each other and losing ground, the government was losing ground. And what we did is as a result of this agreement, we started direct for the first time in 40 years of Afghan history of war, recent war, to talk to each other, to sit across the table, to negotiate eachother--
MARGARET BRENNAN: That took a long time to happen. And those negotiations didn't go anywhere.
KHALILZAD: Well, that is a different question. Why didn't the negotiations go anywhere? Is it-- did the government play a role in the slow rolling of the negotiations? Did the government embrace those negotiations? Did it campaign against the peace process? Of course ideally, I can understand for the government to have wanted to be the one to negotiate everything with the Taliban, including the U.S. forces. But that's what we tried for 18 years or 16 years, to say for the Talibs, "Sit with the government and negotiate." They said first they need to reach an understanding with the U.S. Then they will sit with that with the Afghans, and that's what we did.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Well, that's what the Taliban demanded. But--
KHALILZAD: That's what they demanded. Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But for the United States to agree to that, don't you understand how it poisoned the waters with President Ghani and his government that they wouldn't trust what was about to happen?
KHALILZAD: Well, the question is again, I would come back to what's the- what choices did the government or us face? Do we want to go to continue the war or having come to a judgment that we were not succeeding, we were not winning the war, that we should seek a political settlement, and we- in that political settlement, as I said, we had four elements which included negotiations with the government and a comprehensive permanent ceasefire as part of the agreement. Then, of course, some of the- our leaders here were skeptical about making the withdrawal of the United States forces contingent on a political agreement and a comprehensive ceasefire, because the belief was that we very well will get stuck there because the Afghan government might not want to make a deal, the Talibs might not want to make a deal or the two may not come to an agreement. So at the end, we decided not to do- to- to- to go ahead with a condition based approach, but rather to do a calendar withdrawal.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But essentially--
KHALILZAD: But that's not an agreement. I mean, the difference between what was in the agreement and what we did was the agreement was a conditions-based package, but ultimately the decision was to do a calendar based withdrawal.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right. The conditions went out the door. I mean, Chairman Milley has said that the Taliban didn't live up to this deal, period.
KHALILZAD: No, I mean, our approach, our approach--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Under the Biden Administration, they said, no longer conditions based. We're just out. You're saying--
KHALILZAD: Because of pessimism about- the pessimism about whether the Afghans could reach an agreement, that it may take much longer. And if the Afghans don't reach an agreement and we don't honor the timetable for withdrawal, we could be back at war with the Taliban.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But, and there is plenty of criticism and another hour of what happened with the Afghan government itself. But this was an agreement between the United States and the Taliban.
KHALILZAD: Right. With a full knowledge and- of the Afghan government.
MAARGARET BRENNAN: Mm-Hmm. You were telling them what was happening? Yes.
KHALILZAD: Yeah. We're showing them to the various drafts. They were very pleased with the joint statement that was issued as I said on the same day, with continuing military support, we came to the defense of their forces when they were attacked with--
MARGARET BRENNAN: The Ghani government was not supportive of your work. You know that. I mean, you, you and President Ghani personally had some bad blood. You've known him for years. His office accused you of trying to run for president of Afghanistan yourself at one point.
KHALILZAD: All of that is true, but there was- there was nothing about me in this regard. I was representing the United States to carry out the president's direction, to negotiate the settlement, and the settlement with four elements. But I believe the biggest difficulty was that President Ghani and a few other Afghan leaders did not believe that we were serious about withdrawal for a long time, and they like the status quo compared to a political settlement in which they might not have the jobs that they had and- and the resources that the US was providing would not be there. They preferred the status quo to a political settlement. And then when it became clear that the U.S. was leaving, then they- they miscalculated the effects of-of the continuing war. They were not serious about the political settlement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Yeah.
KHALILZAD: Those are also facts that impacted the situation.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But if the United States is promising essentially to deliver the Afghan government and to make this deal happen, wasn't it diplomatic malpractice--
KHALILZAD: No.
MARGARET BRENNAN --for the secretary of state not to be holding Ghani's hand walking him through this? Shouldn't Mike Pompeo have been doing that? Shouldn't Tony Blinken have been doing that?
KHALILZAD: Both of them spent a lot of time with uh-- President Ghani to take the negotiation seriously to believe that we were--
MARGARET BRENNAN: You don't fault the actions of either Secretary of State?
KHALILZAD: I do not because I believe that both worked extremely hard, extremely hard, that- to do the right thing for Afghanistan. Obviously, first for us in terms of the directions they received from the president, but also to make sure that the terrorism issue was addressed, to make sure that the withdrawal to, that we don't go back to (CROSSTALK)
MARGARET BRENNAN: But how -- the United States -- how was more arm twisting not happening then, if all the blame is to go on the Ghani government--
KHALILZAD: I believe myself, now that you've asked, that rather than that, we pressed Ghani too much, it's my judgment that we didn't press him hard enough. That we-- there were a lot of Afghans who wanted to press Ghani a lot, and they were asking whether it would be OK with us to press him harder. We did not- We were gentle with President Ghani. We used diplomacy. We encouraged him. Once we- Secretary Pompeo threatened to cut off a billion dollars if Abdullah and Ghani- look at this situation, they are losing the war in Afghanistan. They have an election, problematic election only 1.2 million may have participated, to Inauguration- Imagine a situation like that. And Secretary Pompeo threatened to cut off one billion if they don't come to an agreement. So if we had told President Ghani early on that there will be no military support for his security forces if he didn't negotiate seriously. Because he wanted to stay on --
MARGARET BRENNAN: So the Trump administration could have pushed harder.
KHALILZAD: We could have pushed harder. I believe in retrospect, my judgment is that we could have pressed President Ghani harder.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Secretary Blinken has said he inherited the- President Biden inherited this deal and not a plan to execute it?
KHALILZAD: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Whose job was that?
KHALILZAD: Well, I think that they did inherit a-a-a the agreement. No doubt they had that opportunity to take a look at it. And they did. They could have made a variety of decisions with regard to that agreement. They decided to stick with the withdrawal provisions, so--
MARGARET BRENNAN: They claim their hands were tied. It would have required plusing up of U.S. military presence in the country for them to do anything other than accept what you handed them. Do you buy that?
KHALILZAD: I think my judgment is they had two basic options -- go with a condition based approach. See if- if the Taliban have met the conditions of the agreement. The decision could have been, if yes, we'll implement our part of that agreement. Or to go for a calendar based approach. And the decision was to go for a calendar based approach.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think American politics drove this more than the National security strategy?
KHALILZAD: Well, I mean, the question is on the national security and- that we are in a different world than we were in 2001. The biggest issue facing us now is the rise of China. The potential bipolarity...a comprehensive competition--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Sure but Americans just watched on television this chaotic withdrawal.
KHALILZAD: Well, what--
MARGARET BRENNAN: This didn't happen like you imagined it would happen, you have to admit that.
KHALILZAD: Well, I mean, that could be looked at as well. It wasn't good. I agree with that. Nobody says that was good the way it happened--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why wasn't there a better plan in place from the Trump administration or crafted by the Biden administration to execute what you put on paper?
KHALILZAD: Well, this execution of the last phase was not a military withdrawal that went awry. It was the response of the Afghan people to- what was happening that created the scenes at the airport. It was a combination of fear and opportunity.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The Taliban were inside the city, inside Kabul, when President Ghani fled.
KHALILZAD: Right. But they had- we got an agreement with them on the 14, 15 of August that the two small-- four units that were there were, would withdraw, that President Ghani would send an empowered delegation. In fact, there is a report that he video-- prepared a statement on video, his agreement that for the two weeks, sending a delegation, a power sharing government. But why didn't stay to see the implementation of that and withdraw still is unclear.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But the Taliban's literally knocking on the door. Some inside the city of Kabul and the United States military is still there. Why didn't the U.S. State Department have a plan to execute what you negotiated and had been in writing for years? Why wasn't that left by the Trump administration? Why wasn't that created by the- by Tony Blinken and the State Department?
KHALILZAD: The plan for withdrawal, which is the responsibility of the Defense Department, was developed. Gen. McKenzie came on the 15th to exp-explain that to the Talibs in Doha. He and I sat with the Talib leaders and, uh, the military plan was in place and a good plan. What complicated the situation was the popular reaction in Kabul. The cause of which was both fear and opportunity. Fear, because for a long time, everybody was saying, including some officials, that when the Talibs come into Kabul, there would be a terrible war. Street to street fighting, destruction of the city. So people were afraid, that was one. Two, the impression was created that anyone who can make it to the airport, whether you have documents or not, you would be evacuated to the United States and to-to Europe. That combination led to this flood of people to come to the airport and cause the- the- the terrible scenes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But are you saying everything that happened was inevitable?
KHALILZAD: No, I don't think it was inevitable. I think we could have had a negotiated settlement. We could have had the two weeks agreement implemented. There were choices that people made, mistakes also no doubt were made. President Ghani made the choice that he did that caused the forces to disintegrate in Kabul--
MARGARET BRENNAN: To flee the country on August the 15th--
KHALILZAD: To flee the country. Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Some of his allies would argue the military was already melting- melting away. The Taliban was already at the door. He was irrelevant at that point.
KHALILZAD: Not in Kabul, Kabul, a city of five or six million people.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The Taliban was there.
KHALILZAD: The Taliban, as I said, they had some maybe a few hundred forces already in, but they agreed to withdraw that and they announced it. And they said they will take- And they- in discussions with us-- that they will take some of the government leaders, officials into the next government. So the question is, why did President Ghani do what he did? If he was willing to step aside for the sake of peace, imagine if he had offered that a year ago, six months ago -- that somebody that's mutually acceptable could have led the government. But he did not.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But fundamentally, the critique of you is that while you were sitting in Doha and negotiating with Taliban political leaders, their fighters were on the battlefield with no intention to follow through on what you were negotiating. Do you believe that you were misled by the Taliban leaders you negotiated with?
KHALILZAD: I believe that, the agreement said- The agreement said that we will implement what we committed to if the Taliban implemented what they committed to.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Were you negotiating with the right people, though?
KHALILZAD: No doubt because we tested them.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But that's not who's running Afghanistan now.
KHALILZAD: Well they're part of it. But the-the important again, President Ghani's departure created a situation in which the problem became resolved, although instead we will see what ultimately happens, by military means. And that, in turn, empowered the more militant Talibs. I believe that a negotiated withdrawal would have empowered more, the more moderate-- those who were involved in the negotiations. So there-- two factors, the agreement itself was condition-based, a package-
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right. And then the Biden administration said it won't be a conditions-based withdrawal.
KHALILZAD: Well, that's a decision that was made. That was decision a made way above my pay grade.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So how much responsibility lies then with the administration now when you're saying it was all President Ghani. Is there blame to be borne by President Biden and his diplomats who you were working with?
KHALILZAD: Well, I believe that- that the diplomats worked very hard. The president made the decision that he did not to pursue a condition-based approach, but just the calendar-based approach, because of a belief that if you pursue a condition based approach - that the Afghan must negotiate and come to an agreement first - that we will be stuck there for a long time, given what he had learned, his negotiators had learned from President Ghani and from the Talibs -- that they were far apart and an agreement was unlikely on a political formula with the people of Afghanistan desperately needed.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you really believe that the Taliban would have or still will hold elections or share power? Don't they just want to run the country themselves?
KHALILZAD: Sure. I mean, and as President Ghani wanted to run the country himself, didn't want to leave office. That's the- obviously the preferred outcome given their psychologies. But I believe--
MARGARET BRENNAN: And you knew that while you were negotiating with the Taliban, that even though they're agreeing to some form of power-sharing that they, in the end of the day, want to run the country?
KHALILZAD: I thought that they would agree to a power sharing arrangement if- because without that they would have war, we wouldn't leave, because that was condition based. So because I mean, we all have our own wish list, that's what we would prefer. But what would have been realistic and a condition-based approach, either war as far as one can see, or a negotiated political settlement. President Ghani, on the other hand, wanted to stay as president to- for the entirety of his term. And if we had told him we're not going to give you military support unless you compromise, that someone that's mutually acceptable would lead the government--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why didn't that happen?
KHALILZAD: Well, because we were- didn't want to coerce the president of a country (CROSSTALK)
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why couldn't Secretary Blinken have done that?
KHALILZAD: Well look, Secretary Blinken did send a letter which was leaked, as you saw--
MARGARET BRERNNAN: A letter?
KHALILZAD: --to President Ghani soon after he came to power--
MARGARET BRENNAN: It was a strongly worded letter, but it's far different from saying, "I'm going to cut you off unless you do this."
KHALILZAD: Well, I mean, a lot of considerations. President Ghani was very effective in lobbying in Washington. He had many friends in various parts of the city, he lived here for a very long time. He was part of, he have a research center not far from where we are today. So there was some reluctance to do, to put that kind of pressure on him. And all of that is also kind of part of the mix that produced the outcome that- that- that ultimately happened.
MARGARET BRENNAN: I mean, in your resignation letter, you said, "This did not turn out as you envisaged."
KHALILZAD: Right. I would have wished- I would have liked to see a negotiated settlement. I-I feel for Afghanistan. I -- after all, I was born there, and I have spent a lot of my life on behalf of the United States focused on Afghanistan. I helped them with their constitution. I helped them with their first election. I established an American university in-in Afghanistan. I was very encouraged by the first years, the enthusiasm, the hopefulness that I observed there. But unfortunately, the political elite of the country made terrible mistakes. Allowed corruption, misused elections, democracy, and didn't treat their security forces perhaps the way they should have been treated. And we faced the- the circumstances we did. Believe me, when I was there as ambassador, if you had asked me, "Would the United States forces would be in Afghanistan in 10 years?" I would have said "Of course not." But because of what happened there. It had an effect here. And the fact here was, uh, that it's time to move on, given the changes in the world and given that we have had significant success in dealing with the issue of terrorism.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why wasn't there a plan in place, at least on the counterterrorism front, to deal with the Taliban, to talk to the Taliban?
KHALILZAD: Well we did talk to the Taliban. We have a set of agreements with them, some of which have not been released yet, on what they will do on the terrorism front. We hold them accountable to those agreements. And--
MARGARET BRENNAN: So - I'm sorry - because the administration says that those agreements are not in place, which is why they're trying to build those relationships now with the Taliban--
KHALILZAD: No no, there is an agreement in place. There is agreement in place with the Taliban on terrorism and counterterrorism. But--
MARGARET: To do what?
KHALILZAD: Well, that they will not host. They will not allow fundraising. They will not allow training. They will not allow recruitment of- by individuals or groups that will threaten the security of the United States and our allies, including Al Qaeda. But since we don't trust them, we are-- President Biden's decision also having over the horizon, since we are no longer in Afghanistan-- we're in Afghanistan until a few weeks ago--
MARGARET: Right.
KHALILZAD: -- so we were doing it from there. And since we decided to leave, we're going to do that from beyond Afghanistan. And that's what remains a critical mission.
MARGARET So when you say there were counterterrorism plans in place—
KHALILZAD: Agreements in place.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Was that contingent on the United States keeping some kind of presence in Afghanistan?
KHALILZAD : Well, we had agreed to withdraw completely.
MARGARET BRENNAN: I know what we agreed to. But was there a wink and a nod? I know you know--
KHALILZAD:—The the issue was this, and I will tell you—
MARGARET BRENNAN: —We hear from a lot of the same national security officials in this country, not just in Afghanistan, who said, "We are going to keep some people there."
KHALILZAD: Well, what it was is, as I'll describe, which is that the Talibs, as Talibs, they've said repeatedly could not agree to an indefinite U.S. military presence, because that would undermine the very raison d'etre of the struggle of the 17, 18 years--
MARGARET BRENNAN:—To get out the foreign military forces.
KHALILZAD:—the occupation, they described it. But, once there is this negotiated government that the two sides will agree to, the decision on what happens after would be the decision by that government and by the United States. If the president at that time wanted to have a residual force, that had to be negotiated or would be negotiated with that government after a political settlement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So there was a wink and a nod that the United States would keep some kind of presence in Afghanistan. Is that what you're saying?
KHALILZAD: Well, what I am saying is—
MARGARET BRENNAN:—Because that sounds like what you're saying.
KHALILZAD: What I am saying is what I said, which is: that the Talibs could not agree-
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right. But this new government--
KHALILZAD: but if a new government and the United States--
MARGARET BRENNAN: the Taliban would not object to it.
KHALILZAD: And the United States wanted to and that government agreed with it. That's different.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So- so we're saying the same thing, but that went out the window when the United States pulled out completely. So the Biden administration essentially blew up what you were saying were agreements for a framework for a potential agreement--
KHALILZAD: The situation changed--the situation changed radically. We decided to withdraw completely. And two, I think a negotiated agreement by the two sides was not achieved. So the circumstances also changed.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think Americans are safer now?
KHALILZAD: I think a big burden is removed from the United States. Some 40 billion... American soldiers fighting for a war that wasn't going in the right direction. We-- the terrorist threat from Afghanistan is not what it used to be. The American people should be pleased -- not with the way the final phase happened, we all are unhappy with that -- but that the Afghan war is over for the United States. The burden has been reduced, that we achieved the goal of the devastating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The CIA says al Qaeda could reconstitute in as little as a year within Afghanistan.
KHALILZAD: Well, our record of predicting things, unfortunately, we need to be a little humble in this regard, but--
MARGARET BRENNAN: So we're not safer? You're hoping we are.
KHALILZAD: We are much safer than we were before we went to Afghanistan, when al Qaeda was running camps--
MARGARET BRENNAN: You're talking about 2001.
KHALILZAD: --and thousands of people were being trained, al Qaida, the sponsor of Afghanistan. That is gone.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But from August of this year on.
KHALILZAD: Well we need to keep an eye on the situation. Not- not to do the same thing we did prior to 9/11, as we were seeing Al Qaeda was developing, training, organizing. And we didn't have a serious strategy in response to it until after 9/11. We shouldn't repeat that mistake again.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think we are?
KHALILZAD: We should be monitoring and we should be responding as we see the situation evolve. I also believe that unless there is some extreme circumstance, the Taliban have also learned their lesson in which they paid a high price for that, allowing that- the al Qaeda to use Afghanistan. They say, "19 years, 18 years of suffering for one mistake." That's what they used to tell me is--
MARGARET BRENNAN: That's a very big mistake.
KHALILZAD: Big mistake, big response. They got big punishment. But now they've committed not to allow that. And we need to monitor it and be able to respond if we see the threat growing.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you feel you were misled by the Taliban?
KHALILZAD: Well, I don't allow people to mislead me. I do my homework. A whole of government. This was not Zal Khalilzad alone doing this. I had the military, the intelligence, everyone with me.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You're the only one out here defending it though.
KHALILZAD: Yeah, but-- that's one reason why I left.
MARGARET BRENNAN: I give you credit for coming and talking about it.
KHALILZAD: I'm- I- One reason I left the government, as I wrote in my letter, is that- that the debate wasn't really, as it should be, based on realities and facts of what happened, what was going on and what our alternatives were, what we did, what from what we did continued, what was abandoned and why and- and where we should go from here?
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you feel you're a scapegoat?
KHALILZAD: Well, some are trying to- to do that, but I think that would not be fair. Putting me aside as an individual because we wouldn't learn the right lessons then, if we just put it on an individual forever. If we don't ask ourselves, "Why did our military strategy did not succeed? Why did we not achieve the goals over time that we would have liked to achieve with regard to building this new Afghanistan?"
MARGARET BRENNAN: I just want to be clear, because when you say you were not alone in this, you were intimately involved--
KHALILZAD: Sure. Absolutely.
MARGARET BRENNAN --step by step in this with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
KHALILZAD: Right. And with a new team when when they came, and I explained to you what we achieved--
MARGARET BRENNAN: But for the- the majority of two years, it was Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. And he knew everything you were negotiating, correct?
KHALILZAD: Indeed.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So when he runs for president in 2024, as many predict, should he be judged on this?
KHALILZAD: Well, he, but I have to say the agreement that we negotiated was a condition based agreement to end the war in Afghanistan and give the Afghan people a chance for peace. That's what the agreement was.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So he should be judged on that?
KHALILZAD: I mean, if if he does run for president, I'm sure this will be one of the issues on on on which he will be judged, no doubt.
MARGARET BRENNAN: because he says that you negotiated- negotiated a solid deal. It was the execution. It was the execution under the Biden administration.
KHALILZAD: I have described to you what the agreement was
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right
KHALILZAD: The four elements. And I also described to you how the decision ultimately was made to put conditions-based aside and- and follow a calendar basis.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You're laying that on the Biden administration.
KHALILZAD: No I'm just saying it was already happening earlier--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right. And they argue you boxed them in, and that they were boxed in by the prior president.
KHALILZAD: You'll always inherit agreement from the previous group, you either agree to continue with it or you say, "No I would like to renegotiate that." So those are the choices that- that happen all the time. We saw in the previous administration, putting the Iran agreement aside, as that was an option, or adjusting it. But the decision was--
MARGARET BRENNAN: President Biden could have asked to keep troops longer, is what you're saying?
KHALILZAD: He could have, then there would have been consequences for it, which is that the Talibs might not have accepted that and therefore they- no attack on U.S. forces that was in place for so many months, in which not a single American was killed by the Talibs from the agreement until full withdrawal. The Talibs might have put that aside, so that that was the- I think one of the factors that impacted or influenced the decision that he made.
MARGARET BRENNAN: We've been talking about details and politics, but as you made clear, you feel very passionately about the country of your birth, Afghanistan.
KHALILZAD: Absolutely. And I will do what I can from outside as an individual with my contacts and relationships both here, there and the world to help Afghanistan. The struggle goes on. Now it's over to the Afghans. The American encounter with Afghanistan benefited the Afghans enormously. I mean, millions of Afghans with cell phones now connected with the world. Our society has been connected with it. The world has been connected with it and-and now without the military, the burden of the military presence, we need to use all other instruments that we have to encourage it to move towards the- the objectives of an Afghanistan that's at peace with itself and does not pose a threat to the rest of the world.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But when you see pictures of children struggling to eat, when you see the pictures of women being whipped in the streets. How do you feel when you see that? Do you feel any degree of responsibility for this outcome?
KHALILZAD: Actually, there's a lot of work still to be done in Afghanistan. This is a society that has a lot of problems. Uh, uh, we, uh, need to help them come to an agreement on a formula that is broadly accepted by urban and rural Afghans, by secular and religious Afghans. Afghanistan wasn't an ideal place before we made this agreement and we withdrew. There was a war going on every day. Two to three hundred people died. People forget that. People think, "Ah, we had such a good situation, and look what--"
MARGARET BRENNAN: 60 percent of the country in 2018 was under the control of the Taliban when you took this job, the Taliban was winning, as you said.
KHALILZAD: Right. I mean, nobody-- this was a terrible situation. Fewer people die now in Afghanistan than died then. Much fewer people get killed now in Afghanistan, that-that no American gets killed in Afghanistan now.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Thirteen American service people died though.
KHALILZAD: As a result of a terrorist attack at the airport by DAESH, which the Talibs are enemy of--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Carried out by ISIS is who you're talking about.
KHALILZAD: By ISIS, and they are at war with each other.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But that bomber was released from prison by the Taliban.
KHALILZAD: Well, not with the intention--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Not with the intention. But that was what happened. So this wasn't an orderly withdrawal. Thirteen Americans died.
KHALILZAD: Nobody- nobody, I would- I'm not saying it was an orderly withdrawal. This was an ugly final phase. No doubt about it. Could have been a lot worse. It could be a lot-- The Talibs did help with the withdrawal. General McKenzie would tell you they did everything we asked them to do during that final phase. I was on the phone with them constantly, "Push this, close this road, allow these buses." It could have been a lot worse. Kabul could have been destroyed, street to street fighting could have occurred. I went to Afghanistan after 30-plus years after the Soviet withdrawal and what happened? Everywhere you looked, it was destruction like some German city after World War Two. This could have been a lot worse. It could have been a lot worse. It can still be a lot worse, or it can get better. But the choice is now mostly theirs, Afghans. Rumi, the great Afghan born in Balkh, said, "You can walk with people, You can not walk for them." Now it's time for the Afghans to take ownership with non-military assistance, unless we are threatened, then our military should be in play. But we should not abandon Afghanistan, turn our back on it -- use our influence as a country with enormous capability and influence to encourage the emergence of an Afghanistan that the Afghans aspire for.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Ambassador, thank you for your time.
KHALILZAD: Thank you.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Thank you for taking questions.
KHALILZAD: Thank you very much. Good to see you.
