The Next Commander In Iraq: Situation "Dire"
As part of his confirmation hearing to be the next commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. David Petraeus submitted 27 pages of written answers to questions posed by the Senate Armed Service Committee. The answer to the question "What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?" goes on for two and a half pages. For those still interested in dissecting where the U.S. went wrong in Iraq, it's a must-read coming from a man who has been deeply immersed in the war from the beginning.
"First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments thak did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and resume their functions as soon as intermin govermmental structures were in place...The assessment of the Iraqi infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it was... There was an underestimation of the degree of resistance that would develop... There was the feeling that elections would enhance the Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian positions as Iraqis voted largely based on ethnic and sectarian group identity...There was an underestimation of the security challenges in Iraq...coupled with an overestimation of our ability to create new security institutions following the disbandment of the Iraqi security forces...We took too long to recognize the growing insurgency and to take steps to counter it...Misconduct at Abu Ghraib...inflamed the insurgency and damaged the credibility of coalition forces in Iraq...We obviously had inadequate plans, concepts, organizations, resources, and policies for the conduct of...stability and reconstruction operations...In certain (areas) there were more tasks than troops... Repeated operations in Baghdad...to clear hold and build did not prove durable due to lack of sufficient Iraqi and Coalition forces for the hold phase of the operations."
There's more about de-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi Army. By the time you're finished, you wonder what, if anything, the U.S. got right.
Petraeus also included a list of 14 lessons he learned from his two previous tours in Iraq. The first two are "Do not try to do too much with your own hands," and "Act quickly, because every army of liberation has a half-life." As more than one Senator noted, sending more troops seems to violate the first lesson learned and the fact that the American Army has now been in Iraq for nearly four years would seem to violate the second lesson.
Petraeus is also the author of the military's new manual for counter insurgency warfare. According to the manual, he should have one soldier for every 50 inhabitants in order to protect the population. In Baghdad, that works out to 120,000 troops. Counting all the U.S. and Iraqi troops that are supposed to be part of the surge into Baghdad, Petraeus will have 85,000. No wonder, he told the Armed Services Committee, "the situation in Iraq is dire...the way ahead will be hard."
