PART ONE OF TRANSCRIPT OF RATHER INTERVIEW WITH HANS BLIX
In an exclusive interview from Cypress, CBS News' Dan Rather questioned the UN's top weapons inspector Hans Blix and IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei about their thoughts on Iraq's latest delaying tactic for inspections. A portion of the interview was broadcast the CBS Evening News.
The following is Part One of the full-text transcript of Rather's interview with Blix and El-Baradei:
(Dan Rather) Mr. Blix, let's start with you, from your viewpoint, what is the news of the day?
(Hans Blix) Well, the inspections have gone on and we have had the results, more detailed results from the latest visits to the private house and the visit to the warheads that were found the other day, and they confirm the first impressions that these are items that the Iraqis should have declared and they had not declared.
They are not anything that will… they are not weapons of mass destruction themselves, there are no chemicals in this ammunition. But nevertheless they should have been declared, and we will have to destroy them.
(DR) Mohammed ElBaradei, is there, or is there not any doubt in your mind that Iraq has or has had recently a secret nuclear weapons program?
(Mohamed ElBaradei) It's still an open question Dan, I do not want to jump to conclusion, but again like Hans mentioned, a couple of days ago we went to a private home, and we found a cache of original documents that has to do with some studies on laser enrichment… which could be used for enriching uranium. Why these documents have not been declared to us, why these documents have been in a private home? Is there any document that we haven't seen. It's true these are studies that were done in the late 80's. But still it does not show the kind of transparency, the kind of proactive approach which we have been asking Iraq to follow.
And that, that makes me concerned, it makes me aware that we need to do much more additional work before we come to a conclusion. And that's what we're going to tell the Security Council. We're still in mid course and we still need time before we can come to any conclusion. This is an issue of war and peace and we need to make sure before we come to any conclusion that its balanced, objective and professional.
(DR) Where you or were you not surprised to find these documents concerning the possible enrichment of uranium?
(ME) I think, we know about their work in that area in the past, but I was surprised that they did not come with these documents on their own because they have been… keep saying 'you have seen all the documents we .. we have, we do not any longer any document relevant to your work'. And to find these documents and to find them in a private home, it raises a lot of questions, and implications. And these are some of the questions that we are obviously going to investigate when we go to Iraq, and tell them flatly that this is not business as usual. If you need really to provide assurance to the Security Council, you need to shift gear, you need to have a different frame of mind, and you need to be proactive.
Your level of cooperation in the past has not always been consistent, has been quite patchy, and that's not enough for Security Council. That's not enough for many members of the international community, to say that there are still open questions. We need to bring that file to a closure. It has been a file that has been running for 11 years, and I think everybody, with varying degrees is getting impatient that you cannot be certain that Iraq still have or have not weapons of mass destruction. After 11 years of inspections, on again, off again. So there is impatience and they need to understand that time is not on their side.
(DR) Mr. Blix, what is it that you want the Iraqis to do that they haven't been doing?
(HB) Well, the Security Council and the world wants, as Mohammed says, to have confidence that Iraq has no more weapons of mass destruction..or if they have any that they put them up so that they can be destroyed under our joint supervision. They presented us with a declaration of 12 thousand pages, and these pages did not provide any new evidence. There are lots of questions remaining from the past which need to be answered. And they have not been answered by these.
We have also asked for a list of persons who have been engaged in the programs in the past and so that we could interview them to make sure that they are in the peaceful sector. And we got some 400 names from the Iraqi side. And we have in our archives a great many names that would be relevant that they could have included. So you have the impression that it is a bit more for appearance, than for the substance of the cooperation that they do these things. And we need to have the substance of it.
They have been helpful in a number of respects. They have provided access promptly to sites, and they have provided access to all sites. So they've opened doors, now that is important. As transparency, the more doors we go to, the more we go over Iraq, the better. But it's not enough, they also have to tell us where do they have things. We should not have to have intelligence telling us that we should go to this place or that place. The Iraqis should tell us that if they really want to create confidence.
So long as we do not have the confidence, convinced, we cannot suggest to the Security Council that they should have confidence. And this is worrying us. Mohammed says time is running out. The situation is very tense. So we will tell them that now, and we will hope that they will take that message.
(DR) Do you expect, do you intend to speak directly in person with President Saddam Hussein?
(HB) Well, whenever you go to a country as an international official or from a country, you are seeing the people that the country wants to present you with. We have a perfectly valid interlocutor in Dr. Al Sari (?) who is adviser of high standing, and of cabinet level, and who advises Saddam Hussein, and he knows this dossier very well. So there is not problem in discussing directly with him. But of course, whomever will speak, they will send to us, whether it is Saddam Hussein himself will come… or any of the other vice-presidents, we will be glad to talk to them. Because the signal that we have to send to them and tell them is an important one. And it needs to come up to the very top.
(DR) Mohammed ElBaradei, it's well known and documented that the weapons program in Iraq is run basically by people very close to Saddam Hussein. Do you intend to question them? How high up are you prepared to go?
(ME) I think we would like to do everything possible, Dan, to establish the facts. I'd like to add to what Hans is saying. They have been cooperating in terms of process, opening doors. And that's useful, because by going anywhere, many times without any notice. It is a very good, strong deterrence that they cannot probably start new activities. But what we are really after is past activities, whether in the last few years. When we were away, they have developed some weapons of mass destruction, and that is not enough just by telling us 'go and look', you know, 'we have our door open'. They need to come forward, they need to show that they are really interested in disarmament. For example, seeing the senior leadership is one sign of a proactive approach, encouraging us to interview scientists in private is another sign of proactive approach.
And on that point, I think we are going to make it clear to them, that if we identify people whoever they are at whatever level whom we think they are useful to our work, we will ask them to be interviewed in private.
If we need to take them outside the country, we have the authority to do that. If we are not allowed, we report to the Security Council . But reporting negatively to Security Council is not going to help. They need to understand that the road back into becoming full fledged member of the international community starts with a positive assurance that they do not have weapons of mass destruction. That is not going to change, and that message I hope will understand and register with them, and I think Hans and I are going to make as much effort as possible to make it clear to them. We are there to help you if you want to help yourself.
(DR) I expect there are going to be many if not most Americans who read in the newspaper or hear in the radio or television, about this new revelation, the documents indicate some testing about enriching uranium. And to many Americans, they're going to say 'that's it, this guy, the Iraqi people, have been, as president Bush has described it: delaying and engaging in deceit. And many of them will say, 'that's enough, it's time to move'. What can you say to that?
(HB) I think you still have to keep your two feet on the ground. And to keep your sense of proportions. I am not condoning that they did not deliver these documents, or that they did not list this ammunition. At the same time I think it's right to say that the laser enrichment program was one that was known to us in the IA, we worked together then before, and that the documents are from pre 1990. The Gulf war was 91. And the same thing with ammunition. They are for chemical warfare. But they are also from pre 1991. And therefore, it is not as grave.
It should have been declared. It's indicative of the mentality and attitude that is not helpful to them, I think they are shooting themselves in their own foot when they do not declare it. But, we have to keep the sense of proportion too.
(ME) I think Dan, on this particular issue, we are not saying that they have an ongoing nuclear program because these are studies. It was not really experimentation, but theoretical studies mostly in the 80's. But the question is, 'why haven't you declared them?' and if you haven't declared them, is there anything else you haven't declared? And that's a question. It's not a question that we say, 'this is a smoking gun'. Let us jump, you know, let us throw the towel. But it's a question which says, Iraq, change your attitude, member state come us with intelligence as you can. And international organization, intensify your work. We still have work to do before we come to conclusion. I for one, and I think Hans shares that, believe we still need more time before we come to think of other alternative, if we can't resolve the issue through an inspection. And it is important to prove that an inspection does work, not only in Iraq but in many places. We need to look at the big picture – North Korea, everywhere we suspect there are weapons of mass destruction. WE are not going to jump and use armed force every time we suspect a country is having weapons of mass destruction. We need to make sure that.. we work to make sure an inspection work. If it doesn't work, well, that's a different scenario. But let's at least let an inspection take its natural course.
(HB) I'd also add that there are, of course, differences between the different programs. Mohammed is responsible for eradicating the nuclear weapons program. And the nuclear sphere requires a much bigger infrastructure for making weapons, for making enriched uranium. Whether you use laser, or you use the centrifuges, than does biological weapons. We are responsible for weeding out the biological and chemical and the missiles. And biological as you know, does not necessarily take up much space.
In fact in the United States, you have not yet found the anthrax production place for the anthrax that we used in the terror bombs. So this is much harder to be sure that there is no little place where they can produce anthrax, and they, the Iraqis have to make a greater effort to convince us.