The Electoral Issue:

The Challenge:

Problems:

The Present: More Violence, More Casualties

In 2009, President Obama announced that he was sending an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total American presence there to almost 100,000. NATO contributions bring the total to approximately 130,000 troops. When Obama announced the surge, he also detailed an exit strategy - we would begin drawing down troops in 2011 and leave Afghanistan entirely by 2014. The new strategy was designed to help the Afghan government contain the insurgency and develop a stronger domestic security force, and improve self-governance.

The price has been steep: the United States was in Afghanistan for almost 9 years before the American death toll reached 1,000, it took only 27 more months for the death toll to reach 2,000.

The Future: Afghan Security & Stability

After American and NATO troops leave Afghanistan, what happens next? It is likely that, with continued counterterrorism efforts, the United States will be able to prevent a reconstitution of large-scale terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Afghanistan, by many measures, is still rife with corruption, plagued by a tenacious insurgency that threatens to overwhelm the country when we leave, lacking a capable domestic security force able to quell the insurgency on their own.

The Afghan National Army currently totals approximately 200,000 soldiers, with a NATO-set goal of 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police by the time foreign troops leave Afghanistan, but many are not fully trained and battle-tested. One member of Afghanistan's Parliament told Time Magazine in 2011, "The time is not right for a transition to Afghan security forces. They are not ready. They are not well trained, and they are not commanded and organized well." Many analysts worry that the Taliban is simply waiting for American and NATO forces to leave before they overwhelm whatever fledgling security apparatus we leave in our wake.

Pakistan

Analysts speak of the "Af-Pak" region because policymakers tend to see Afghanistan and Pakistan as an inextricably linked unit. The border between the two countries - much of it navigating a forbidding, mountainous area - is very porous, difficult to monitor, and even more difficult to secure. Where Pakistan is concerned, what happens in Afghanistan does not tend to stay in Afghanistan. Pakistan is currently hosting approximately 3.5 million Afghan refugees, driven out of Afghanistan by conflicts dating back to the Soviet invasion of the 1980s.

On top of this huge refugee problem, the strong ties between terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan ensure that anarchy in Afghanistan would empower terrorists in Pakistan, who could more easily destabilize the Pakistani government if they could operate from a save haven next door. In an interview with The Guardian, Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari blamed the chaos in Afghanistan for destabilizing his country, explaining, "Just as the Mexican drug war on US borders makes a difference to Texas and American society, we are talking about a war on our border which is obviously having a huge effect." The prospect of terrorist activity or instability in Pakistan becomes far more perilous in light of country's nuclear arsenal - estimated at over 100 warheads.

Human Rights

The U.S. presence in Afghanistan increased autonomy for Afghan women, who have been able to attend school and move more freely in Afghan society without fear of reprisal from the Taliban or other militant Islamists. If the Taliban is able to reassert itself, these women will be pulled backward.

Jargon Watch:

"Listen to military commanders and decide based on conditions on the ground."

Some policymakers insist that we should defer to the judgment of the military commanders in Afghanistan when setting a timetable for withdrawal. This sounds like prudent policymaking, but it largely ignores the reality of civilian control of the military. It is up to the president, as Commander-in-Chief, to set military policy; the commanders can advise but are ultimately bound to follow the mission dictated by the president. The office of the presidency, by constitutional design, does not exist as a rubber stamp for the proposals of military commanders.

Next page: Proposals

Proposals:

Proceed with Planned Withdrawal

American and allied forces will begin transitioning responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghan National Army in 2013, with the Afghans assuming full responsibility by the time foreign troops are gone in 2014. By the end of 2012, 33,000 American troops will leave Afghanistan (40,000 including NATO forces.) The remainder will leave in phases throughout 2013 and 2014. Mitt Romney says he agrees with the 2014 departure date, but has criticized the President for announcing a timetable, accusing him of tethering his foreign policy to electoral politics and disregarding the advice of field commanders who requested a longer presence for more troops.

Challenges: The United States cannot stay indefinitely - but is the U.S. staying long enough? Are the gains we've secured too fragile to leave the Afghans to their own device after only two more years? The Taliban could aggressively reassert itself, claiming control over large portions of Afghanistan and taking the fight directly to the fledgling central government. The terrorist networks that we worked so hard to disrupt could reconstitute and begin planning new attacks.

Proponents of proceeding with the planned withdrawal must be pressed to explain the trade-offs of such a decision - what is the likelihood that a 2014 withdrawal would leave Afghanistan vulnerable to a resurgent Taliban?

Stay Longer

Mitt Romney has not committed to a longer stay in Afghanistan, but has said that "Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders," contrasting this approach with what he calls Obama's "politically inspired" timetable.

While Romney has been reluctant to indicate whether he thinks we should stay longer, other members of his party have not been so coy. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. has said, "I don't see any kind of pressure to withdraw immediately." McCain argues that from a "pure military, tactical standpoint, we are winning, but, what the president keeps talking about, is how quick we're going to withdraw," leaving many to conclude that he would prefer a longer stay to help safeguard our progress and put Afghanistan on more stable footing before we withdraw.

Challenges: Few who would elect to stay longer will say so outright; instead, they often couch this suggestion in the language of "conditions on the ground" and "listening to our military commanders." The reason is obvious - it's politically perilous for anyone to suggest a longer stay in a country that the United States has occupied for over a decade.

Large majorities of the American public, including a strong plurality of Republicans, would like the troops to leave sooner rather than later. America has already spent approximately half a trillion dollars on the war in Afghanistan (on top of almost a trillion dollars in Iraq), according to the Congressional Research Service. Can we really afford to continue financing these costly overseas operations?

Moreover, there is no guarantee that a longer presence would produce a significantly better outcome. Proponents of staying longer must answer two questions - how much longer does the United States stay? And what can be achieved in that amount of time that cannot be achieved by 2014?

Negotiate with the Taliban

The Afghan government's relationship with the Taliban will be a critical determinant of Afghanistan's future stability. Despite the near-universal recognition of the Taliban as a bad actor, the Afghan government and elements of the U.S. military have engaged in secretive, high-level negotiations with Taliban commanders, trying to persuade them to buy into (rather than blow up) the Afghan government after foreign forces leave. If we can persuade the most tenacious element of the insurgency to seek a governing stake through legitimate, peaceful political channels rather than violence or civil war, we could put Afghanistan on a far more stable footing moving forward. President Obama has endorsed (and carried out) a policy of negotiating with the Taliban; Mitt Romney has declared his opposition to any negotiations with the Taliban.

Challenges: Negotiating with an a group that is killing American soldiers is an obviously distasteful process. If we can persuade the Taliban to buy into the Afghan government - and that is a big if - there is no guarantee that they will not revert to violent form if and when their political interests are not met by the political process.

Politics involves a delicate balance of competing power interests and goals - nobody can get what they want all of the time. There will inevitably come a moment when the Taliban's cooperation with the central government does not achieve everything sought - what will they do then?

Cut Military Aid to Pakistan

Pakistan is the third largest recipient of U.S. aid money (after Afghanistan and Israel), and has received more than $18 billion from America since the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001.

After Osama bin Laden was killed at a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, mere miles from a Pakistan's army headquarters, some U.S. lawmakers caled for a withdrawal of Military aid from Pakistan, arguing that elements of the Pakistani government must have been aware of bin Laden's whereabouts, and that we should not be subsidizing a regime that would harbor the world's most notorious terrorist.

Pakistan's incarceration of a doctor, Dr. Shakil Afridi, who assisted America's search for bin Laden, on treason charges has only added fuel to the fire. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in response, voted to cut $33 million in foreign aid to Pakistan following the aoctor's conviction. Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) went a step further, proposing a bill to eliminate all foreign aid money sent to Pakistan. Paul explained, "Pakistan must understand that they are choosing the wrong side. They accuse Dr. Afridi of working against Pakistan, but he was simply helping the U.S. capture the head of al Qaida. Surely Pakistan is not linking their interests with those of an international terrorist organization."

Challenges: Pakistan is a nuclear power, dealing with instability from extremists within the country. U.S. aid dollars buy Pakistan's cooperation in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan (supply routes, etc), and they also help the Pakistani army maintain control over a country that frequently seems to teeter on the edge of a coup. Cutting foreign aid would jeopardize Pakistan's facilitation of American goals in the region and could well jeopardize the security of Pakistan's government and, by extension, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Proponents of cutting foreign aid must explain what they will do to ensure Pakistan's continued cooperation with America in the region, and how they will ensure that the loss of aid money does not jeopardize the security of Pakistani nukes.